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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
TURKISH BANKING SECTOR 
 
 
 
Nazan DEMİR 
 
ECONOMICS M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. İnci GÜMÜŞ 
 
 
Keywords: capital structure, optimal leverage, partial adjustment model, crisis 
 
 
This study examines the determinants of capital structure for deposit banks in Turkey 
during the period 1995-2016, focusing on the impact of macroeconomic factors and 
financial crises. The paper also analyzes whether different bank characteristics such as 
income variability, growth opportunity, tangibility, size, and profitability have a different 
effect on the capital structure of deposits banks during the crisis periods. The partial 
adjustment model is used to examine the determinants of capital structure and the 
adjustment speed toward the optimal capital structure. The model is estimated using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. The results indicate that growth 
opportunity, GDP growth and inflation have a positive relationship with leverage, 
whereas profitability, tangibility, and crises have a negative relationship. Moreover, 
income variability is found to have a negative effect on leverage for crisis periods. The 
results also show that capital structure behaviour of deposit banks in Turkey is in line 
with the pecking order theory. The findings indicate that the rate of adjustment to optimal 
capital structure for deposit banks in Turkey is 30 percent per year.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
SERMAYE YAPISI DİNAMİKLERİ: TÜRK BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜNÜN 
AMPİRİK ANALİZİ 
 
 
 
Nazan DEMİR 
 
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. İnci GÜMÜŞ 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: sermaye yapısı, optimum kaldıraç, kısmi ayar modeli, kriz 
 
Bu çalışma, makroekonomik faktörlerin ve finansal krizlerin etkisine odaklanarak, 1995-
2016 döneminde Türkiye'deki mevduat bankaları için sermaye yapısının belirleyicilerini 
incelemektedir. Tez ayrıca, gelir değişkenliği, büyüme fırsatı, somutluk, büyüklük ve 
kârlılık gibi farklı banka özelliklerinin, kriz dönemlerinde mevduat bankalarının sermaye 
yapısına farklı etkileri olup olmadığını incelenmektedir. Sermaye yapısının 
belirleyicilerini ve optimal sermaye yapısına yönelik ayarlama hızını incelemek için 
kısmi ayar modeli kullanılmıştır. Model, Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Yöntemi (GMM) 
tekniği kullanılarak tahmin edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, büyüme fırsatı, GSYİH büyümesi ve 
enflasyonun kaldıraçla pozitif bir ilişki içinde olduğunu gösterirken, karlılık, somutluk ve 
krizlerin negatif bir ilişkiye sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, gelir değişkenliğinin 
kriz dönemleri için kaldıraç üzerinde olumsuz etkisi olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Sonuçlar 
ayrıca Türkiye'deki mevduat bankalarının sermaye yapısı davranışının finansal hiyerarşi 
teorisi ile uyumlu olduğunu göstermektedir. Bulgular, Türkiye'deki mevduat bankaları 
için optimal sermaye yapısına ulaşma oranının yılda yüzde 30 olduğunu göstermektedir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Banks fulfill a significant role in the financial system and the economy. As a vital 
component of the financial system, banks perform like a bridge between savers and 
borrowers to allocate excess funds efficiently. They also serve specialized financial 
services which help to reduce information asymmetries in the economy and as a result 
lead to a more efficient economy. On the other hand, shareholders of the banks expect the 
values of their shares to be at their maximum. Therefore, to carry out its services and 
operations, and maximize its market value, having the right amount and structure of 
capital is crucial for a bank. The capital structure of a bank is about how to construct the 
mixture of the capital out of differing amounts of equity and debt. The relative amount of 
debt a bank utilizes is called the debt ratio or the leverage ratio and will be the focus of 
this study.  
 
There are many theoretical and empirical studies on the banks’ capital structure and 
factors affecting banks financing decisions. However, researchers still struggle to gather 
conclusive results for determinants of capital structure under a universal theory. The most 
prominent of capital structure theories are Modigliani and Miller’s theory, trade-off 
theory, and pecking order theory, which are explained in detail in the next section. 
 
Empirical studies carried out on the capital structure of banks focus on the factors that 
affect the banks’ capital structure and the relationship between banks' capital structure 
and its determinants. These studies are mainly about developed countries. Like other 
sectors, banking sector is also influenced by the state of the economy. One might expect 
that crises, which are episodes when the risk of lending increases and funding 
opportunities become scarce, would have an impact on the capital structure of banks. 
There are very few studies analyzing the capital structure of banks in developing countries 
which take the effects of crisis periods into account.  
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In this study, we analyze the capital structure decision of deposit banks in Turkey, 
estimating the determinants of capital structure by a dynamic model. In particular, we 
examine the banks’ speed of adjustment towards optimal leverage and analyze how 
economic instabilities like crises and macroeconomic factors affect banks’ decisions on 
capital structure. Our study is the first study that investigates banks’ capital structure 
behaviour in Turkey during crisis periods, taking into account both the 2001 Turkish crisis 
and the 2009 global crisis. This is also the first study that investigates the adjustment 
speed to optimal capital structure in the Turkish banking sector. 
 
Our empirical analysis is conducted using annual data for 58 deposit banks operating in 
Turkey through the 1995-2016 period. We use leverage ratio as the dependent variable 
which is calculated as the ratio of debt to total assets of a bank. The bank-specific 
characteristics that we use are income variability, growth opportunity, tangibility, size, 
profitability, and bank age. For the macroeconomic variables, we use GDP growth rate, 
inflation rate and a dummy variable for the crisis periods, which are the 2009 global crisis 
and the 2001 Turkish crisis. In addition, the effect of each bank characteristic during 
crises is measured by interacting each bank-specific variable with the crisis dummy.  
 
We find that crises have a significant and negative effect on leverage. This result suggests 
that it becomes more difficult and costly for banks to use debt financing during crisis 
episodes and banks tend to reduce their leverage. The two macroeconomic variables, GDP 
growth rate and inflation, have a positive effect on leverage. Among the bank 
characteristics, growth opportunity has a positive, profitability and tangibility have a 
negative effect on leverage. These three variables are the only bank-specific variables that 
have a significant effect on leverage. Furthermore, despite being insignificant for the 
whole period, the effect of income variability becomes significantly negative during the 
crisis period. When evaluated according to different theories suggested in the literature, 
our findings are overall in line with the pecking order theory. 
 
We also perform two robustness checks for our analysis. First, we analyze the effects of 
the 2001 Turkish crisis and the 2009 global crisis separately by using two separate dummy 
variables in the regression analysis. The results show that the negative effect of the 
general crisis dummy holds for both crisis episodes. Second, to check whether foreign 
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and state ownership of banks have any effect on leverage, we introduce two new 
variables. The effects of foreign-ownership and state-ownership are measured by two 
dummy variables which represent foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks. In 
addition, the effects of these two ownership characteristics during crises are captured by 
interacting the ownership dummies with the crisis dummy in respective regressions. The 
results show that foreign ownership has a weakly positive effect on leverage, while state 
ownership does not have a statistically significant effect, and the interaction terms are 
insignificant as well.  
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2. THEORIES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
In this section main theories on capital structure are reviewed. The starting point of the 
modern theory of capital structure is the Modigliani and Miller’s proposition of 1958. 
Following this, different theories on capital structure have been developed. The most 
prominent of these theories are trade-off theory and pecking order theory, which are 
explained below. 
 
 
2.1. Modigliani-Miller Theory 
 
 
Modigliani & Miller’s (1958) proposition which is also called the ‘Irrelevance Theory’ is 
the first study for modern finance by introducing an explicit theory about capital structure. 
They show that under the assumptions of perfect markets (that is a market with no taxes, 
no transaction costs and asymmetric information, no bankruptcy cost, full competition 
and no arbitrage opportunities), a firm’s total market value is independent of its capital 
structure. That is, it does not matter what capital structure a firm has for financing its 
operations. They argue that the cost of capital is independent of the indebtedness of the 
firm. They show that investors who invest in a firm with a low debt ratio have the same 
returns as investors who invest in a firm with a high debt ratio. The theorem which was 
subject to criticism due to its unrealistic assumptions was later revised. In 1963, 
Modigliani & Miller proposed a new model including corporate taxes as a factor that 
affect capital structure choices. According to their revised theory, there is a linear relation 
between debt and the firm’s market value in a world where there is a corporate tax. In 
other words, financing its operations only with debt and not using equity is the optimal 
decision for a firm. Value of firm increases with debt financing due to tax shield 
advantages. Modigliani & Miller’s theory provides a theoretical framework for 
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understanding the capital structure but does not provide realistic descriptions of how firms 
should decide on an optimal capital structure (Frank and Goyal 2005). 
 
 
2.2. Trade-off Theory 
 
 
In contrast to the irrelevance theory, the trade-off theory, introduced by Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), takes market imperfections into account. This theory proposes that 
the optimal debt ratio is established by balancing the trade-off between the benefit and 
cost of debt. The foremost benefit of debt is the tax deductibility of interest cost of debt. 
However, debt causes agency problems between shareholders and debt holders and 
increases the firm’s financial distress. According to this theory, the optimal capital 
structure is achieved when the marginal present value of the tax shield on additional debt 
is equal to the marginal present value of the financial distress cost of additional debt 
(Bradley et.al., 1984). Value-maximizing firms are supposed to choose the level of debt 
by balancing cost and benefits associated with debt financing (Frank and Goyal 2009). 
However, the optimal debt ratio varies across firms because tax rate, bankruptcy costs 
and the impact of financial distress differ across firms. 
 
 
2.3. Pecking Order Theory 
 
 
Another important theory of capital structure which was developed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) is the pecking order theory. According to this theory, firms prefer internal funding 
over external funding for funding capital. The theory emphasizes the information 
asymmetry between the firm insiders (managers) and the outside investors. The level of 
asymmetric information may vary between firms and may be more severe when different 
parties have different levels of information. The pecking order theory ranks the financial 
sources according to the degree of influence of asymmetric information and follows a 
financial hierarchy in order to minimize the asymmetric information problem between 
insiders and outsiders. The firm has three sources of funding: retained earnings (internal 
funds), liabilities and equity (external funds). For funding and avoiding financial distress, 
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the firm first uses retained earnings and only then switches to debt and equity, 
respectively. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
The literature on capital structure started primarily through studies on non-financial firms. 
In the past six decades, several theories have been developed and many empirical studies 
have been conducted for better understanding the relationship between the leverage ratio 
of non-financial firms and its determinants.  
 
Most empirical studies explain capital structure of the banks in a similar way the empirical 
literature on non-financial firms explains. Excluding the services, they provide, the main 
difference between non-financial firms and banks are the specific regulations that banks 
are subject to. However, the studies suggest considerable similarities between capital 
structure decisions of banks and firms and emphasize that the minimum capital adequacy 
ratios that banks should adhere to have a secondary effect on the capital structures of 
banks. The early studies on bank capital structure using corporate finance approach such 
as Diamond and Rajan (2000), Barth et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2008), Brewer et al. 
(2008), Bakkar et al. (2019) observe that the bank capital ratio is much higher than the 
regulatory minimum which means that bank-specific regulations are not binding. Besides, 
Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Allen et al. (2009) 
develop capital structure theories where capital structure requirements are not necessarily 
binding and of secondary importance. Moreover, Heider and Gropp (2010) argue that the 
similarities of capital structures of banks and non-financial firms are important. They find 
that the standard cross-sectional determinants of firms' capital structure also apply to large 
publicly held banks in the US and Europe. This paper also borrows from the capital 
structure literature on non-financial firms to explain the capital structure of deposit banks 
in Turkey. 
 
Despite the vast literature on capital structure and its determinants, studies on capital 
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structure and its behaviour during crisis and non-crisis periods are relatively less. Besides, 
studies on developing countries are rare compared to the studies on developed countries. 
This paper brings together the literature on (i) the effect of macroeconomic variables and 
crises on banks’ capital structure and (ii) the effects of bank characteristics on banks’ 
capital structure during crisis and non-crisis periods in Turkey.  
 
Davis and Stone (2004) show that crisis episodes have an effect on banks' capital 
structure. They examine 59 crises in 29 OECD countries from 1970 to 1999. They find 
that the decline in GDP during crises leads to a decrease in the leverage ratios of banks. 
Furthermore, if it is a banking crisis, they show that the effect of the crisis is greater 
compared to currency crises. The level of external financing options and bank lending 
opportunities make the effect of a crisis on banks’ capital structure less severe. A similar 
paper by Ariff et al (2008) study the effects of the Asian crisis and macroeconomic 
variables on banks’ leverage ratio. Their results are similar to Davis and Stone (2004) 
showing that banks reduce their leverage during crises because of scarce financing 
sources. Deesomsak (2004) analyzes the influence of crises on firms’ capital structure 
and finds that because of lending market inefficiencies, the adjustment of the leverage 
ratio, which falls during a crisis, is slower in developing countries. Among more recent 
papers, Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) analyze the capital structure of firms in Australia 
before and after the 2009 Global crisis. They find that, although the significance of the 
influence of crisis depends on the maturity of debt used, the 2009 Global crisis affected 
the firms’ leverage negatively. 
 
There are also papers which find opposing results compared to the studies mentioned 
above on the effects of crises on capital structure. Campello et al (2010) examine 800 
firms from 31 countries in Europe, Asia, and North America. They show that despite the 
restraining effects of the global financial crisis on the level of leverage, firms which have 
more internal funds do not change their leverage during a crisis. Moreover, they show 
that the 2009 global crisis did not cut the borrowing opportunities as much as the estimates 
found by previous studies. Forsberg (2012) investigates firms in the US and find similar 
results to Campello (2010). They show that the leverage ratio had in fact increased as a 
result of the global crisis. Furthermore, the effects of the crisis on the capital structure of 
firms have dissolved one year after the end of the crisis. 
9 
 
 
Besides macroeconomic factors and crises, there are also numerous papers examining the 
effects of bank characteristics on leverage. Despite a long list of bank-specific variables 
affecting the capital structure of banks, the results found in the literature on their effects 
are mixed. Bank characteristic which are widely examined in the literature are income 
variability, growth opportunity, tangibility, size and profitability. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Aybar-Aries (2011) find that income 
variability has a negative effect on leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) emphasize that firms 
with more volatile cash flow face higher expected financial distress and use less leverage. 
On the other hand, Heshmati and Tsoy (2017) analyze capital structure determinants for 
Korean listed companies over the period 1985-2015 and find a positive relation between 
income variability and leverage. 
 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) show that firms with high growth opportunities tend to have 
low leverage ratios. The negative effect of growth opportunity is also confirmed by 
Deesomsak et al (2014). In a different study, Joong et al. (2008) examine a sample of 42 
countries between 1997 and 2001 and find that growth opportunity has a significant and 
negative effect on the level of debt a firm uses. On the other hand, Aybar-Aries et al. 
(2011) examine the capital structure determinants for Spanish small-medium enterprises 
during the period 1995-2005 and find that growth opportunity is positively related to 
leverage. 
 
Some studies in the literature have shown that tangibility is positively related to leverage. 
Among these studies, Titman and Wessel (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Antoniou et al. (2008) can be counted. On the other hand, Aybar-Aries et al (2011) find 
a negative effect and Heshmati (2001) finds no relationship between tangibility and 
leverage. 
 
The results of the studies analyzing the effects of size on capital structure are also mixed. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), who study firms from G-7 countries from 1987 to 1991, and 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), who examine firms from 10 developed countries for the period 
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1980-1990, find similar results. They show that size has a positive effect on the level of 
leverage of a firm. However, Kim and Sorensen (1986) find no effect of size on the capital 
structure of a firm.  
 
Titman and Wessel (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find 
a negative relationship between profitability and the level of leverage. That is, more 
profitable firms tend to have a lower leverage ratio than less profitable firms. Morri and 
Beretta (2008) examine US firms and confirm previous findings on the relationship 
between profitability and capital structure. However, Kleff and Weber (2003) examine 
capital structure determinants for German Banks during the 1992-2001 period and find 
that profitability has a positive effect on banks’ leverage. 
 
Most of the studies in the literature are about developed countries and there are not many 
studies analyzing banks' capital structure for developing countries such as Turkey. The 
papers that study the capital structure of deposits banks in Turkey are reviewed in more 
detail below. 
 
Sak and Caglayan (2010) examine the capital structure of banks using the static panel 
data analysis method. Their data consist of the 1992-2007 period, identifying two sub-
periods as before and after the 2001 financial crisis. They show that size and growth 
opportunity have positive effects while tangibility and profitability have negative effects 
on leverage. Moreover, the effect of size on leverage is higher whereas the effects of 
tangibility and growth opportunity are lower after the crisis period. They also conclude 
that the results are consistent with the pecking order theory. 
 
Baltaci and Ayaydin (2014) explore the effects of bank-specific and macroeconomic 
factors on leverage using data for the Turkish Banking Sector during the 2002-2012 
period. Using dynamic panel data estimation, they conclude that size, GDP growth, and 
industry leverage are positively associated with leverage; tangibility, profitability, 
inflation, and financial risk are negatively associated with leverage. Their findings on 
tangibility and GDP growth are consistent with the predictions of pecking order theory 
whereas size is inconsistent. Their findings show the importance of macroeconomic 
factors on capital structure decisions and suggest that the capital structure of financial and 
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non-financial firms is ultimately determined by the same drivers. 
 
Gocmen and Sahin (2014) investigate the bank-specific determinants on capital structure 
for Turkish deposit banks between 2004-2011 using a static panel data approach. To 
analyze the effects of different variables on capital structure before and during the global 
crisis, the overall sample period is divided into two sub-periods: the period before the 
global crisis, 2004-2007, and the period during the global crisis, 2008-2010. Their 
findings in general support the pecking order theory. They find a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage for the full period they investigate. Their findings also 
show that larger banks and banks with more growth opportunities tend to use more 
leverage for the whole sample period. They also find Turkish deposit banks with highly 
volatile operating income tend to use less leverage before and after the crisis. 
 
This study aims to fill a gap in the literature on capital structure of banks in Turkey by 
analyzing the effects of macroeconomic determinants and crises, taking into account both 
the 2001 Turkish crisis and the 2009 global crisis. This is also the first study that 
investigates the adjustment speed to optimal capital structure in the Turkish banking 
sector. 
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4. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
 
 
In the literature, two types of econometric models have been used to test the behavior of 
capital structure of firms: the static models and the dynamic models. Early studies use the 
static model by implicitly assuming the existence of an optimal (target) debt ratio and that 
all firms are already at their optimal ratio. These studies do not take into account the 
adjustment costs, information asymmetries and transaction costs. After the proposal of 
the trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberg (1973), numerous empirical studies have 
been conducted on capital structure. Some of these studies have attained inconsistent 
results with the trade-off theory. Myers (1984) introduces some adjustment costs as an 
explanation of why the change in capital structure does not occur as often as the static 
models predicts. The discrepancies between the empirical results and the predictions of 
the trade-off theory led to the development of a new capital structure model that has been 
widely used and supported by many studies: the dynamic capital structure model (see 
Heinkel and Zechner 1989; Heshmati 2001; Aybar-Arias 2011; Huang and Ritter 2009 
among others). Dynamic models assume that firms’ capital structure decisions are 
continuous decisions. In this continuous process, not only the costs and benefits of debt 
but also the adjustment costs and investment decisions are taken into consideration. The 
dynamic framework is based on the idea that the adjustment to the optimal capital 
structure would occur partially and gradually over time, hence the name partial 
adjustment model. This model is used in our analysis to analyze the impact of capital 
structure determinants and adjustment costs on capital structure. For this reason, our first 
assumption would be the existence of transaction costs that banks face and partial 
adjustment from their current leverage to their optimal leverage. Unlike static models, 
dynamic models assume banks face transaction costs that make it difficult for them to 
reach their optimal leverage level. So, banks reach progressively to their optimal leverage 
level in a sufficiently competitive market. 
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Following works by Heshmati (2001), Flanney and Rangan (2006) and Aybar-Aries 
(2011), a dynamic model is constructed. The optimal debt ratio of the bank is a function 
of a set of explanatory variables as denoted in Equation 1. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  = F (𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡)     (1)   
 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗   is the optimal leverage ratio of bank i at time t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of bank and 
time variant determinants of the optimal leverage, 𝜂𝑖 is a vector of bank variant 
determinants that are constant over time and 𝜏𝑡  is a vector of time variant macroeconomic 
determinants.  
 
In a perfectly frictionless environment (that is, with no adjustment costs), banks would 
immediately respond with a complete adjustment by equalizing existing leverage ratio 
and optimal leverage ratio. Then, observed leverage 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 should be equal to the optimal 
leverage 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗ . 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡      (2) 
 
This implies that the change in observed leverage from the previous to the current period 
should be exactly equal to the change required for the bank to be at optimal leverage at 
time t; 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡- 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1=𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1  (3) 
 
However, if there exist adjustment costs for banks to reach their optimal leverage, there 
can be cases when banks might find it easier and less expensive to adjust gradually. By 
introducing an adjustment speed factor 𝛿, partial adjustment will take place and it will be 
represented by a standard partial adjustment model (Kim et al. 2005; Banerjee et al 2004) 
denoted as; 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡- 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1=𝛿 (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1)   (4) 
 
where 𝛿 is the adjustment parameter which represents the magnitude of desired 
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adjustment between two subsequent periods or the rate of convergence of 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 to its 
optimal value. 
 
Equation (4) represents the dynamic behaviour of a particular bank that adjusts to the 
target leverage ratio in the presence of adjustment costs. The existence of adjustment 
speed is represented by the restriction  |δ| < 1 and implies that 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 → 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  as 𝑡 → ∞. 
Clearly in the existence of adjustment costs, the adjustment coefficient 𝛿 is expected to 
be between 0 and 1. If 𝛿 greater than 1, that means banks over-adjust and if 𝛿 less than 0, 
that means banks deviate from target leverage over time. By rearranging Equation (4) and 
adding a statistical error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, we reach the following econometric model; 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 =(1-𝛿) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 +δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗    +   𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  is a linear function of the form 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜑𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝜂𝑠𝑖 +
∑ 𝜆𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝜏𝑚𝑡         (6) 
 
Combining Equation (5) and Equation (6), the following equation is derived: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 =(1-𝛿) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 +δ(𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜑𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝜂𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝜏𝑚𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (7)   
 
By re -arranging Equation (7), we obtain: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 =(1-𝛿) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛼0  ∑ 𝛿𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛿𝜑𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝜂𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝜆𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝜏𝑚𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (8) 
 
By rewriting Equation (8), we obtain Equation (9), which will be used in our benchmark 
analysis; 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝛿0 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 +∑ 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐽
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜌𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝜂𝑠𝑖 + ∑ Υ𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝜏𝑚𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡       (9)  
where  𝛿0 = 1 − 𝛿,   𝑎0=𝛿𝛼0  , 𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝛽𝑗  , 𝜌𝑠 = 𝛿𝜑𝑠 , Υ𝑚 = 𝛿𝜆𝑚. 
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5. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Our empirical analysis covers the Turkish banking sector comprising 58 deposit banks 
over the years 1995 to 2016. We use annual data, which are obtained from several sources. 
The data on bank characteristics are collected from The Banks Association of Turkey 
(Türkiye Bankalar Birliği, TBB). The data for macroeconomic variables are obtained 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database and Bloomberg Terminal. We 
use book value of leverage as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables that 
represent bank characteristics are income variability, growth opportunity, tangibility, 
size, profitability, and bank age. The macroeconomic explanatory variables are GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate and a dummy variable for the 2009 global crisis and the 2001 
Turkish crisis. Time trend is also used as an explanatory variable. We removed investment 
banks from our sample since behavior of these banks does not correspond to the credit 
behavior of deposit banks. We also remove banks which contain less than 3 annual 
observations in any variable from our sample because they distort the analysis. The 
variables used in the econometric analysis are explained in detail below. 
 
 
5.1. Dependent Variable 
 
 
Leverage 
 
In the capital structure literature, there are two different approaches to measure the 
leverage. Some studies use book value of debt to total assets to define leverage (Banerjee 
et. al. 1999; Fama and French 2002). These studies claim that the book values are 
independent of the factors that are not directly under the control of the bank. On the other 
hand, some studies use market values (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Flannery and Rangan 
2006). They argue that the market values reflect agency problems between creditors and 
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equity holders. Some other studies use both book and market values (Titman and Wessels 
1988). Because of availability of data, we use book value of leverage and measure it as 
the ratio of total debt-to-total assets. Figure 5.1.2 shows changes in the average leverage 
of deposit banks in Turkey over the years 1995 to 2016.  
Figure 5.1.2 Mean Observed Leverage 
 
 
 
5.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
 
To examine the determinants of capital structure, we use six explanatory variables to 
represent bank characteristics, which are commonly used in the literature. We also add 
two macroeconomic variables and a crisis dummy variable since capital structure 
literature shows that macroeconomic variables and crises also have a significant effect on 
capital structure (Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; De Jong et al. 2008; Mahakud and 
Mukherjee 2011; Heshmati and Tsoy 2017). 
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Income Variability  
 
Variance of operating income is used to measure income variability. Volatility of 
operating income has a direct influence on default risk. Default risk acts as a mechanism 
that balances debt financing to protect companies from bankruptcy, thus preventing 
companies from over-utilizing debt (Aybar-Aries 2011). Default risk causes direct or 
indirect distress costs for the company and increases probability of bankruptcy (Mackie-
Mason 1990). Therefore, it can be predicted that companies with higher volatility of 
operating income tend to reduce debt ratio according to the trade-off theory. From the 
pecking order perspective, companies with volatile stock prices are expected to be also 
highly volatile in terms of their market beliefs and may suffer from adverse selection 
problem. If that is the case, risky firms have a higher debt ratio than the others (Frank and 
Goyal 2009). Therefore, from the pecking order theory perspective income variability is 
positively related to the leverage. 
 
Growth Opportunity 
 
Empirical studies measure growth opportunity by using two proxies: market values-to-
book values of banks (Sak and Caglayan 2010) and the annual percentage change in total 
assets (Heshmati 2001; Aybar-Aries 2011). Because of data availability, we use 
percentage change in total assets for our empirical analysis. According to trade-off theory, 
high cost of debt will lead companies to use more equity or retained earnings and less 
debt. Higher growth opportunities allow companies to take more risks by accepting riskier 
projects. Hence, banks would put into operation inefficient investments. This situation 
increases agency conflicts, and lenders would demand higher returns, which implies an 
increase in the cost of debt. Thus, there exists a negative relation between growth 
opportunity and debt ratio (Deesomsak et al. 2004). In addition to this point, according to 
Harrisoman and Widjaja (2014), banks with higher growth opportunities tend to shy away 
from using debt for financing because this may lead to lack of internal resources when 
there is an attractive investment opportunity. So, leverage will be negatively associated 
with growth opportunities. On the other hand, growing firms would need more funds, 
beyond internal financing, to fund their investments. So, they prefer external funding 
through debt financing. Therefore, pecking order theory predicts a positive relation 
between growth opportunity and leverage. 
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Tangibility 
 
The ratio of tangible assets-to-total assets is used as a measure of tangibility for the study. 
Tangible assets are a kind of fixed assets and generally could not be converted to cash 
and similar assets rapidly. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), tangible assets behave 
like a collateral and decrease adverse selection problem for the company. From this 
perspective, tangible assets automatically decrease the risk of the lender who are exposed 
to agency problem costs. As a result, lender would be more willing to supply loan to the 
bank in case of a high tangibility ratio which in return reduces the cost of debt. This means 
there exists a positive relation between tangibility and leverage which is consistent with 
trade-off theory. On the other hand, pecking order theory predicts that firms with less 
tangible assets confront higher information costs and prefers debt to equity. In other 
words, tangibility and leverage are negatively related. 
 
Size 
 
The logarithm of the total assets is used as a proxy for the size of bank. According to 
Titman and Wessel (1988), larger firms are more diversified, have a more stable cash 
flow (collateral) and offer less risk to lenders. As a result, cost of debt reduces, and firms 
tend to have more debt than equity and hence have higher leverage. In addition, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) argue that large firms tend to borrow more because the degree 
of bankruptcy risk decreases with the size of the firm. Therefore, the firm size is expected 
to be positively related with leverage. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also argue that the factors 
like lower agency cost of debt, easy access to credit markets, less volatile cash flows, and 
requirement to fully benefit from the tax shield promote positive relation between size 
and leverage. Following the trade-off theory, it is expected that firm size is positively 
related to leverage. Regarding to pecking order theory, larger firms have less information 
asymmetry. As a result, the chance of issuing undervalued equity is reduced and firms 
encourage to use equity financing (Rajan and Zingales 1995). In addition, Frank and 
Goyal (2009) state that larger firms have easier access to the capital market than smaller 
firms. As a result, it is easier to utilize equity more than their smaller counterparts. So, 
these firms use less debt. Therefore, pecking order theory predicts a negative relation 
between size and leverage. 
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Profitability 
 
The ratio of net income to total assets is used as a measure of profitability. Expected 
financial distress costs, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, and interest tax shields lead more 
profitable banks to have higher leverage ratios according to trade-off theory. In profitable 
banks, debt costs will be low due to the low risk of bankruptcy. Tax shield advantages 
also induce more profitable banks to finance themselves with debt. Trade-off theory 
expects a positive correlation between profitability and leverage. On the other hand, 
pecking order theory says that there exists asymmetric information between shareholders 
and creditors, which makes firms prefer internal funding to external funding for financing 
the company. Hence, asymmetric information causes firms to prefer retained earnings for 
financing investments and only use external funds in case of unavailability of internal 
funds. As a result, profitability is expected have a negative relationship with leverage. 
 
Bank Age 
 
Age of bank is measured in terms of years from the establishment year until the end of 
the sample period (if it is still alive on 31.12.2016) or the closure of the bank. Heshmati 
and Tsoy (2017) argue that there can be a positive or a negative relation between age of 
bank and leverage. That is, over the years, banks can increase leverage to increase 
capacity and survive. On the other hand, banks can also accumulate profits over the years 
and use it in case of financial needs instead of debt (Diamond 1989). 
 
GDP Growth  
 
GDP growth rate is measured as the annual percentage change in real GDP. GDP growth 
rate proxies the growth opportunities of firms in the overall economy (Joeveer 2013). In 
view of the pecking order theory, firm profitability is expected to rise, allowing firms to 
use externally generated earnings to finance future investments since external funds are 
preferred over internal funds in periods of economic growth. Therefore, the theory 
forecasts a positive relation between GDP growth and leverage. Regarding the trade-off 
theory, firms with higher growth opportunities are likely to suffer from financial distress 
and excess debt problems. Therefore, these firms tend to use equity more than debt. 
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Inflation 
 
Inflation rate is measured as the annual growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Inflation has two contradicting effects on the capital structure of banks. Since borrowing 
has higher tax advantages via tax deductions in high inflation periods, inflation has a 
positive effect on leverage (Taggart 1985). On the other hand, high inflation may cause 
high interest rates and therefore prevent banks from borrowing more (Drobetz and 
Wanzenried 2006). Empirical studies show mixed results meaning there is evidence in 
support of both effects (Deesomsak et al. 2004).  
 
Crisis  
 
The crisis dummy is used to measure the direct effect of crises on leverage. The dummy 
variable takes the value 1 if it is a crisis period (the 2001 Turkish crisis and the 2009 
global crisis) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Time Trend 
 
Time trend is used to see whether bank leverage changes over time and has a drift. The 
relationship with time trend can be increasing or decreasing over time.  
The following table shows bank-specific variables that are used in empirical studies and 
predictions of the main theories for the relationship of these variables with leverage. 
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Table 5.2.1 Common Capital Structure Determinants and Prediction of Theories 
Variable  
Trade-off 
Theory 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
Literature 
Income Variability -  + 
Nivorozhkin (2004)                           
Deosomak et al. (2004) 
Kim et al. (2006) 
Huan & Song (2006) 
Growth 
Opportunity -  + 
Heshmati (1999)         
 Ozkan (2001)                                     
Frank & Goyal (2009)                         
Ayber-Aries et al. (2010) 
Tangibility  +  - 
Heshmati (1999)       
 Ozkan (2001)                                     
Frank & Goyal (2009)                         
Ayber-Aries et al. (2010) 
Size  +  - 
Myers (1977)                                    
Myers & Majluf (1984)                    
Titman & Wessel (1988)                   
Ozkan (2001) 
Profitability  +  - 
Bennett & Donnelly (1993)                
Deesomsak et al. (2004)                 
Huang & Song (2006)                          
Groop & Heider (2010) 
 
 
The following table reports summary statistics for our dataset for the whole period (1995-
2016). 
Table 5.2.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Leverage 0.863 0.168 -0.093 2.456 
 Income Variability 0.643 1.176 0.001 18.433 
 Growth Opportunity 2.713 39.627 -0.999 1010.328 
 Tangibility 0.031 0.049 0.001 0.519 
 Size 13.821 3.119 4.897 19.739 
 Profitability 0.012 0.207 -3.198 0.968 
 Bank Age 54.951 34.437 19 154 
 GDP Growth 0.056 0.046 -0.1 0.112 
 Inflation 0.074 0.06 0.016 0.213 
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6. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
6.1. Estimation Methodology 
 
 
To analyze the dynamic capital structure model, different estimation techniques such as 
OLS, fixed and random effect models, and instrumental variable techniques have been 
used in the literature. Ignoring fixed effects and endogeneity problems may cause these 
techniques to be biased and lead to inconsistent estimations. Taking into account possible 
correlation structures of error terms with delayed variables, we estimate the model using 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). System GMM allows us to overcome endogeneity and serial correlation in the 
error terms, it is robust to heteroscedasticity, and deals with unbalanced panel data 
problems. GMM methods have two different estimation techniques: utilizing levels or 
differences of the variables. Since, in general System GMM gives more efficient and 
consistent results than Difference GMM, we use System GMM procedure for our 
analysis. Following Aybar-Aries et al. (2011) and Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006), two-
step System GMM estimation technique is used in our study. The Hansen test and the 
AR-2 test are used to test the model fit. The Hansen test is a test of exogeneity of all 
instruments as a group and results confirm the validity of the instruments with significant 
p-values. The AR-2 test is a test of second order residual autocorrelation and results 
confirm the absence of second order serial correlation in the residuals.  
 
 
6.2. Results 
 
 
Estimation results are given in Tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Table 6.2.1 shows the results for 
the benchmark model where leverage is explained by bank and time variant variables, 
23 
 
macroeconomic variables, and the crisis dummy.  
 
The benchmark results show that lagged leverage has a positive and significant effect on 
leverage. That means, as predicted by the dynamic theory, the banks' leverage ratios in 
Turkey converge to an optimal leverage over time. Estimated coefficient of lagged 
leverage is 0.70 and has a significant effect on leverage. That shows banks adjust to their 
long-term target leverage, but they are under-adjusting with a speed of 0.30 (𝛿0 = 1 −
𝛿).   Adjustment speed can also be viewed as units in terms of years with the help of a 
conversion formula: (𝑙𝑛0.5)/ (𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛿)) or (1/𝛿), which give 1.94 and 3.33 years 
respectively (Huang Ritter 2009; Mukherjee and Mahakud 2010). Banks, on average, 
reach their target in 3.33 years or travel the half distance to their target from the current 
year in 1.94 years. That is, when a shock that moves a bank away from the optimal capital 
structure, it takes 3.33 year to completely cover the leverage gap. Relatively lower 
adjustment speed suggests that banks face higher adjustment costs. For example, De 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) find that adjustment speed for Spanish banks is equal to 0.2 
which is a relatively slow rate. They argue that possible reason for the relatively low 
adjustment rate can be attributed to the less developed bond market in Spain. Although it 
is hard to compare countries’ speed of adjustment rates due to different economic 
environments, differences in selecting determinants for estimation and differences of data 
sets, it is still possible to make similar comments for Turkey. That means, the findings of 
adjustment speed rate can be associated with the level of development of financial 
markets of Turkey. International evidence for developing and emerging economies shows 
adjustment speed range from 17.9%-60.2% per year. The result for Turkey is, therefore, 
consistent with international evidence. 
 
Among the bank characteristics, growth opportunity, tangibility and profitability have 
significant effects on leverage, with tangibility and profitability being more significant. 
Profitability has a negative and strongly significant impact on leverage, which means that 
banks with higher profitability have a lower leverage ratio. This finding is consistent with 
pecking order theory which predicts that firms with higher profitability rely on retained 
earnings before borrowing debt. Tangibility also has a negative and significant effect on 
leverage. This is also consistent with pecking order theory which says that firms with less 
collateral face higher information costs and prefer debt to equity. This finding is also 
consistent with empirical results that Baltaci and Ayaydin (2014) suggest. Growth 
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opportunity is found to have a positive effect on leverage. This result is also consistent 
with pecking order theory which suggests that a firm with a higher growth opportunity 
would need more funds and tend to use external funding (Frank and Goyal 2009; Groop 
and Heider 2010). Income variability, size and bank age do not have a statistically 
significant effect on leverage. Overall, considering the coefficients of bank-specific 
determinants of leverage, the results reveal that capital structure behavior of deposit banks 
in Turkey is in line with the pecking order theory. 
 
GDP growth rate has a significantly positive effect on leverage, and it is consistent with 
the pecking order theory. This result shows that banks prefer external financing through 
debt funding than internal financing in periods of economic growth.  
 
Inflation rate also has a positive and statistically significant effect on leverage. Joeveer 
(2005) says that inflation is predicted to be positively related to leverage due to higher 
real value of tax deductions on the debt. 
 
The crisis dummy has a significant and negative effect on leverage. This result suggests 
that it becomes more difficult and costly for banks to use debt financing during crisis 
episodes and banks tend to reduce their leverage.  
 
To understand whether bank characteristics have a different effect on leverage during 
crises compared to normal times, interaction terms for banks characteristics with the crisis 
dummy are included as additional variables in the regressions and the results are reported 
in Table 6.2.2.  The results show that only the interaction term for income variability has 
a statistically significant effect on leverage. It has a negative effect during crises while its 
effect is positive for normal times. As shown in Table 6.2.1, its effect is insignificant for 
the whole period. That is, income variability, which is a proxy for default risk, works in 
opposite directions in terms of its effect on leverage during crisis and non-crisis periods, 
and these effects cancel out when the whole period is considered. All other interaction 
terms are insignificant, which suggests that the other bank-specific variables do not have 
a different impact on leverage during crises. 
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Table 6.2.1 Benchmark Regression Results 
 
Variables Leverage 
Leverage(t-1) 0.707*** 
  (4.31) 
Income Variability -0.000943 
  (-0.11) 
Growth Opportunity 0.000146* 
  (1.95) 
Tangibility -0.263** 
  (-2.10) 
Size -0.00162 
  (-0.38) 
Profitability -0.866*** 
  (-11.77) 
Bank Age 0.0000789 
  (0.45) 
GDP Growth 0.371*** 
  (3.06) 
Inflation 0.311*** 
  (3.51) 
Time Trend -0.000116 
  (-0.07) 
Crisis -0.0594*** 
  (-4.07) 
Constant 0.271** 
  (2.30) 
Number of Observations  574 
Number of Groups 58 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.337 
AR (2) Test (p value) 0.551 
 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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Table 6.2.2 Regression Results with the Interaction Terms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Leverage(t-1) 0.664*** 0.694*** 0.703*** 0.686*** 0.706*** 
  (4.33) (4.19) (4.37) (4.50) (4.37) 
Income Variability 0.0256* 0.00000350 -0.000154 0.00230 -0.00241 
  (1.65) (0.00) (-0.02) (0.28) (-0.29) 
Growth Opportunity 0.0000518* 0.000146* 0.000143* 0.000139* 0.000152** 
  (1.76) (1.97) (1.87) (2.00) (2.05) 
Tangibility -0.277** -0.279** -0.293** -0.259** -0.249* 
  (-2.38) (-2.14) (-2.15) (-2.38) (-1.86) 
Size -0.00100 -0.00141 -0.00151 -0.00255 -0.00107 
  (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.57) (-0.26) 
Profitability -0.868*** -0.875*** -0.882*** -0.847*** -0.921*** 
  (-19.15) (-13.99) (-12.68) (-10.73) (-12.24) 
Bank Age 0.000132 0.0000806 0.0000426 0.000110 0.0000199 
  (0.83) (0.47) (0.29) (0.61) (0.12) 
GDP Growth 0.340*** 0.343** 0.349*** 0.284*** 0.367*** 
  (2.98) (2.56) (3.16) (2.98) (2.92) 
Inflation 0.314*** 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.276*** 0.330*** 
  (3.32) (3.55) (3.41) (2.88) (3.85) 
Time Trend 0.000867 -0.000226 -0.000235 0.0000956 -0.000319 
  (0.82) (-0.15) (-0.15) (0.06) (-0.21) 
Crisis -0.0348** -0.0555*** -0.0459 -0.354 -0.0634*** 
  (-2.30) (-3.43) (-1.51) (-1.60) (-4.58) 
Crisis*Income 
Variability -0.0385**         
  (-2.11)         
Crisis*Growth 
Opportunity   -0.0170       
    (-0.51)       
Crisis*Tangibility     -0.593     
      (-0.44)     
Crisis*Size       0.0195   
        (1.44)   
Crisis*Profitability         0.130 
          (0.83) 
Constant 0.277*** 0.284** 0.279** 0.305*** 0.270** 
  (2.71) (2.33) (2.36) (2.89) (2.28) 
            
Number of 
Observations  574 574 574 574 574 
Number of Groups 58 58 58 58 58 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.498 0.305 0.393 0.612 0.333 
AR (2) Test (p value) 0.575 0.548 0.556 0.593 0.533 
 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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7. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
7.1. Separation of the 2001 Turkish Crisis and the 2009 Global Crisis 
 
 
As a first robustness analysis, we separate the 2001 Turkish crisis and the 2009 global 
crisis to understand whether these two crises have different effects on leverage. The 2001 
Turkish crisis is a banking crisis that originated in Turkey. The 2009 global crisis is 
different from the 2001 Turkish crisis since it originated in the US and globally affected 
all economies. In order to analyze the effects of these crises on leverage separately and 
check whether our results still hold, we re-run our benchmark regression with the separate 
crisis episodes. The first column in Table 7.2.1 shows the results for the case where the 
two crisis periods are represented by two separate dummy variables. The results show 
that both of the crises have a negative and statistically significant effect on leverage. The 
other results are similar to the benchmark regression, with only the significance level of 
some of the variables changing. 
 
 
7.2. Effects of Foreign Ownership and State Ownership 
 
 
As a second robustness analysis, we include two separate dummy variables for foreign 
banks and state banks in order to check whether our findings still hold when we expand 
our regression with these new explanatory variables. 
 
Foreign-owned banks reduce the concentration in the banking sector and increase 
competition in the country they start to operate in. Foreign banks also reduce bankruptcies 
and non-performing loans with risk mitigation techniques and play a pioneering role in 
the process of bank risk management. These banks increase financial diversity by offering 
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new financial services (Akgüc 2007). However, foreign banks may also increase the 
effects of economic instability by carrying it from their home country, deepen the crises 
by abruptly leaving the country they are operating in or over-restrict their activities in 
case of crises because of the global risk reduction policies of the headquarters, thus 
leading to a more severe crisis. (Akgüc 2007). Because of these reasons, foreign banks 
may act differently in terms of their capital structure.  
 
State banks may also display different behavior in capital structure decisions since they 
may be affected by political influence. Thus, we may observe a different effect on 
leverage for state banks. 
 
In order to capture the effect of foreign-ownership of deposit banks on leverage, we use 
a dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank is foreign-owned and 0 otherwise. To capture 
the effect of state-ownership of deposit banks on leverage, we use a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if the bank is state-owned and 0 otherwise. With newly created foreign ownership 
dummy and state ownership dummy, we re-run our main regressions to understand the 
effect of these variables on leverage for the whole sample period and the crisis period. 
Regression results are reported in Table 7.2.1. 
 
The results indicate that foreign ownership has a positive effect on leverage, but this effect 
is not strongly significant. State-ownership and the interaction terms of these variables 
with the crisis dummy have no significant effect on leverage for deposit banks in Turkey. 
The significance and signs of all other variables are similar to our benchmark regression. 
These results show that foreign banks resort to debt more than domestic banks, even 
though this effect is not very strong.  
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Table 7.2.1 Robustness Analysis Results  
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Leverage(t-1) 0.681*** 0.703*** 0.709*** 0.704*** 0.709*** 
  (4.53) (4.21) (4.33) (4.22) (4.40) 
Income Variability 0.00406 -0.00122 -0.000890 -0.00153 -0.000796 
  (0.40) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-0.10) 
Growth Opportunity 0.000137* 0.000142* 0.000145* 0.000139* 0.000144* 
  (1.84) (1.88) (1.95) (1.82) (1.95) 
Tangibility -0.319* -0.278** -0.265* -0.286** -0.262* 
  (-2.61) (-2.16) (-1.97) (-2.39) (-1.98) 
Size -0.00116 -0.00159 -0.00177 -0.00171 -0.00180 
  (-0.28) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.37) (-0.43) 
Profitability -0.888*** -0.870*** -0.867*** -0.863*** -0.865*** 
  (-20.13) (-11.69) (-11.73) (-9.21) (-11.43) 
Bank Age 0.0000866 0.000155 0.0000712 0.000156 0.0000717 
  (0.50) (0.87) (0.39) (0.89) (0.39) 
GDP Growth 0.206* 0.366*** 0.371*** 0.384*** 0.372*** 
  (2.10) (2.98) (3.06) (3.04) (3.09) 
Inflation 0.293** 0.316*** 0.311*** 0.324*** 0.312*** 
  (3.40) (3.58) (3.51) (3.60) (3.52) 
Crisis   -0.0602*** -0.0593*** -0.0411** -0.0594*** 
    (-4.09) (-4.07) (-2.11) (-3.84) 
Time Trend -0.000442 -0.000232 -0.0000834 -0.000226 -0.0000522 
  (-0.29) (-0.14) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.03) 
2001 Turkish Crisis -0.122***         
  (-3.66)         
2009 Global Crisis -0.0199**         
  (-2.78)         
Foreign   0.0129   0.0174*   
    (1.39)   (1.99)   
State     0.00356   0.00279 
      (0.31)   (0.23) 
Crisis*Foreign       -0.0444   
        (-0.77)   
Crisis*State         0.00970 
          (0.25) 
Constant 0.302** 0.268** 0.272** 0.266** 0.271** 
  (2.77) (2.27) (2.24) (2.31) (2.29) 
Number of 
Observations  574 574 574 574 574 
Number of Groups 58 58 58 58 58 
Hansen Test (p 
value) 0.415 0.361 0.321 0.655 0.551 
AR (2) Test (p value) 0.567 0.521 0.552 0.571 0.531 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study explores the determinants of capital structure for deposit banks in Turkey 
during the period 1995-2016. The partial adjustment model is used for dynamic panel 
data approach.  The model is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique. The results of the econometric analysis show that growth opportunity, 
GDP growth, and inflation are significantly and positively; tangibility, profitability, and 
crises are significantly and negatively associated with leverage. On the other hand, 
income variability, size and bank age have no statistically significant effect on leverage. 
Additionally, income variability has a negative effect on capital structure during crisis 
periods. 
 
Using a dynamic model, we also examine the speed of adjustment towards the target 
leverage. According to the estimation results, deposit banks in Turkey reach their target 
in 3.33 years on average. 
 
The results also show that the 2001 crisis and 2009 crisis have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on leverage when analyzed separately. We also find that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on leverage, even though this effect is not very strong, 
and state ownership does not have a significant effect. 
 
The results, overall, show that other than bank characteristics, macroeconomic factors 
and crises have a significant effect on capital structure of banks in Turkey. Hence, these 
factors should be taken into account in analyzing the capital structure decisions of banks. 
The results also suggest that the behavior of banks in Turkey is in line with the predictions 
of the pecking order theory.  
 
There are points one may consider for future research. First, variables such as size and 
growth opportunity can be reconstructed by using market value of banks instead of total 
assets. Second, country specific variables such as level of stock market development and 
bond market development may be used in the model.   
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